North Carolina Distributor Agreement

In Count I, the applicant accuses his complaint that the defendants seriously violated the oral distribution agreement by terminating it in April 2003, more than four years before the agreement expired. As a result of the defendant`s breach, the applicant accuses him of denied the profits of his marketing company Staron, while significant marketing costs were incurred. Defendant`s argument claim does not say a claim because the verbal agreement is blocked by the law of fraud. [4] (Defs.` Mr. Supp. Word. Dismissal at 6-7.) Instead, the applicant bases his argument almost exclusively on Varnell v. Henry M. Milgrom, Inc., 78 N.CApp. 451, 337 S.E.2d 616 (1985). In Varnell, a peanut producer sued the purchaser of his peanuts for violating an alleged oral modification of the underlying written sales contract. Id. at 452, 337 S.E.2d at 617.

The complaining farmer claimed that a subsequent oral agreement had changed the price and quantity conditions of the original contract. Id. at 454, 337 S.E.2d at 618. The court found that the oral amendment to the contract was contained by the Commercial Uniform Code (“UCC”), N.C Gen.Stat. 25-2-209. Id. at 453, 337 S.E.2d at 617. On appeal, the complaining farmer argued that the fraud law did not apply, but if that were the case, the defendant buyer would have waived the defence.

Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals debated the waiver, analyzed the decisions of other jurisdictions, and concluded that there were no facts to support the complainants` assertion of an oral waiver. Id. at 457, 337 S.E.2d at 620. The applicant`s argument here, in essence, that, because the Varnell court considered whether the oral amendment of a written contract could waive the UCC`s status of fraud, that court should also consider relinquishing N.C. Gen.Stat. 75-4. Plaintiff admits that there is no signed agreement, as required by the law of fraud, but, nevertheless, defendants have asserted their right to the right of fraudsters or, alternatively, are prohibited by the defense argument on the basis of the doctrine of the promissory estoppel.